Amid calls for the removal of Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, Prof. Joash Amupitan, over alleged links to the All Progressives Congress, APC, the Association of Legislative Drafting and Advocacy Practitioners, ALDRAP, has asked an Abuja Federal High Court to declare that prior political party affiliation does not disqualify him from the position.
DAILY POST reports that Amupitan has come under fire, with opposition political parties and some Nigerians demanding his resignation, or sack, on the grounds of partisanship. The calls came after old social media handles allegedly linked to the INEC chairman, in which he made several posts in support of the APC, surfaced.
However, ALDRAP, an association of Nigerian legislative lawyers, has taken the debate over Amupitan’s suitability as INEC chairman a step further by seeking a judicial interpretation of Section 156 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, which stipulates that the chairman and commissioners of the electoral commission should not belong to political parties.
The suit is also seeking the enforcement of fundamental rights to association, as provided by sections 40 and 46 of the Nigerian Constitution.
In the suit, which has the Incorporated Trustees of the Association of Legislative Drafting and Advocacy Practitioners, ALDRAP, as plaintiff, and the Chairman of INEC as defendant, the court is asked to determine “Whether upon a proper construction of Section 156 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered by the Fifth Alteration Act, 2010), the provision is intended to take effect from the date of nomination of a person for appointment as Chairman or Commissioner of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and not to disqualify such person on the basis of political party affiliation prior to such nomination”.
Based on the answer to the question highlighted for determination, ALDRAP is asking the court for three reliefs, including a declaration that the proper interpretation of Section 156 of the Nigerian Constitution is that the said provision becomes operative from the date of nomination of any person for appointment as chairman or commissioner of INEC.
The declaration, if made by the court, would mean that any political affiliation before nomination and appointment cannot disqualify an INEC chairman or commissioner on the grounds of partisanship.
The declaration would also imply that the INEC chairman or commissioner can only be disqualified on the grounds of partisanship based on political affiliations after assuming the position.
The plaintiff is also asking the court to declare that Section 156 of the Constitution does not apply to political party affiliations of any person prior to their nomination and confirmation as chairman or commissioner of INEC.
ALDRAP is also asking the court to make a declaration that any interpretation of Section 156 of the Constitution which disqualifies a person on account of prior political party affiliation before nomination is unconstitutional as it violates the right to freedom of association guaranteed under Section 40 of the Constitution.
Stating the grounds for the application, ALDRAP noted that the suit is predicated on the grounds that Section 40 of the Constitution guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of association, including the right to belong to any political party.
Other grounds outlined in the originating summons are: “Section 156 of the Constitution prescribes qualification/disqualification criteria for members of certain federal executive bodies, including the Independent National Electoral Commission.
“The intention of Section 156 is to ensure neutrality and independence of INEC officials upon assumption of office, not to penalize lawful political participation prior to nomination.
“Any interpretation extending Section 156 to pre-nomination political affiliation would: a. unjustifiably restrict constitutionally guaranteed rights; b. produce absurd and impracticable consequences; c. discourage civic and political participation.
“Constitutional provisions must be interpreted holistically and in a manner that promotes, rather than restricts, fundamental rights.”
The plaintiff noted that, as a public interest organization, it is entitled to institute the action in the interest of constitutional clarity and protection of fundamental rights.
