The Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative (DRLI) has raised concerns over the protection of voters’ personal information in Nigeria, alleging widespread gaps in transparency, accountability and compliance with the Nigeria Data Protection Act (NDPA) 2023 by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the 36 State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs).
The organisation warned that the absence of visible data protection safeguards and regulatory enforcement could undermine public confidence in the electoral process ahead of the 2027 general elections, particularly as INEC holds the biometric and demographic information of more than 94 million registered voters.
The concerns were contained in a study titled Voter Privacy and Umpires’ Transparency: An Assessment of the Electoral Bodies’ Compliance With the Nigeria Data Protection Act (NDPA) 2023, authored by data protection lawyers Olumide Babalola, PhD, and Solomon Okedara, Esq., with funding from Luminate.
The report examined the obligations of electoral institutions under Nigeria’s data protection framework, the extent to which those institutions publicly demonstrate compliance and the effectiveness of regulatory oversight in protecting citizens’ electoral information.
According to the researchers, Nigeria has a reasonably comprehensive legal framework for protecting personal data, but its implementation across electoral institutions remains inconsistent and largely reactive.
The study concluded that the country’s data protection framework for elections is “on its face, reasonably comprehensive”, while institutional practice “remains reactive, uneven across tiers of government, and largely unaccompanied by visible enforcement”.
The researchers explained that the challenge was not merely the existence of data protection laws but whether the institutions collecting and processing citizens’ information could demonstrate compliance with their statutory responsibilities.
They maintained that electoral bodies have a duty to conduct their activities transparently while safeguarding the privacy of citizens whose personal information is essential to the electoral process.
The study described this relationship as the tension between “umpire’s transparency” and the privacy rights of voters, explaining that public confidence in elections depends on both institutional openness and the lawful handling of personal information.
The assessment combined a review of the NDPA 2023, the Electoral Act 2026 and relevant judicial decisions with an examination of the websites and publicly available privacy disclosures of INEC and the 36 SIECs.
It also reviewed INEC’s handling of the 2026 disclosure of voter information belonging to actor-turned-politician Emeka Ike and considered responses to Freedom of Information requests, including requests directed to the Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC).
On INEC’s compliance, the report stated that the electoral commission had operated without a privacy policy on its website until litigation prompted the publication of one.
It referred to Suit No. FHC/YNG/CS/148/26, Incorporated Trustees of Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative v. INEC, pending before the Federal High Court in Yenagoa.
The researchers argued that the privacy policy subsequently published by INEC addressed incidental website activities, including forms, cookies, enquiries and recruitment, but provided limited information concerning the handling of electoral data.
They noted that the policy did not adequately explain data protection arrangements relating to voter registration, biometric capture, the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV).
However, the authors acknowledged that INEC had introduced a separate Personal Biometric Registration Application privacy policy, effective from July 2026.
According to the report, that policy addresses biometric enrolment, transmission of information to backend systems, disclosure to authorised service providers, data retention on devices and contact information for a Data Protection Officer.
The researchers nevertheless maintained that the electoral commission had not publicly provided the contact details of its Data Protection Officer in the manner required under Article 11(2) of the General Application and Implementation Directive.
They argued that accessible contact information was important because voters needed clear channels through which they could seek explanations about the handling of their data and exercise their statutory rights.
The report, however, cautioned that the absence of a particular privacy notice on INEC’s website did not, by itself, conclusively establish a violation of Section 27 of the NDPA in relation to the voter register.
It explained that voter registration takes place primarily at physical registration centres rather than through the commission’s website, making it necessary to examine the notices and information provided to voters at the actual points of data collection.
The researchers also raised concerns about whether INEC had conducted a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) in connection with its processing of biometric information.
They maintained that collecting and processing the sensitive biometric records of more than 94 million voters met the threshold for high-risk processing under Section 28 of the NDPA.
According to the study, there was no publicly available evidence confirming that the required assessment had been undertaken.
The authors did not, however, establish that no assessment existed, but identified the absence of verifiable public information as a transparency concern requiring further examination.
The study found more extensive gaps at the state level, where the researchers examined the public-facing data protection practices of all 36 State Independent Electoral Commissions between May and September 2026.
According to the findings, only about four commissions, namely those in Lagos, Edo, Benue and Rivers states, maintained dedicated websites.
None of the 36 state electoral commissions was found to have a published privacy policy during the assessment.
The researchers observed that several commissions depended on state government websites that were not designed to provide detailed privacy disclosures, while others relied primarily on social media platforms or maintained outdated and inactive websites.
Based on the five indicators used in the assessment, the electoral commissions in Lagos, Edo, Benue and Rivers were classified as having medium levels of publicly observable compliance.
Seven others, namely Ekiti, Kaduna, Kebbi, Ondo, Osun, Oyo and Taraba, were classified as having low-to-medium levels, while the remaining commissions were rated low.
The researchers described the findings as demonstrating a “near-total absence” of visible privacy governance at the state level.
They warned that the uneven availability of safeguards and information could create a situation in which a voter’s protection becomes “a function of geography rather than a uniformly guaranteed right”.
However, the study explained that a low rating did not necessarily mean that a commission had no internal compliance measures.
It stressed that the lack of publicly available evidence should not automatically be interpreted as proof that all 36 SIECs had substantively breached the NDPA.
Rather, the ratings reflected gaps in digital transparency and the difficulty of independently assessing whether the institutions were fulfilling their data protection responsibilities.
The report also examined the visibility of compliance audits and enforcement activities involving electoral institutions.
According to the researchers, they found no publicly available evidence confirming the filing of Compliance Audit Returns by INEC, the SIECs or registered political parties.
They also found no publicly available evidence of NDPC audit or enforcement actions involving those institutions during the period examined.
The report noted that the absence of such information did not establish that audits had never been conducted or that the institutions were necessarily in breach of the law.
It nevertheless maintained that the lack of visible records made it “difficult to independently verify” compliance.
The researchers contrasted the limited information available about electoral institutions with an increase in Compliance Audit Return filings generally, from 1,864 in 2020/2021 to 4,691 in 2023/2024.
A major aspect of the study concerned the disclosure of voter information belonging to Emeka Ike in 2026.
The researchers used the incident to examine the obligations imposed on data controllers under Section 40 of the NDPA, particularly in relation to breach notification, communication with affected individuals and documentation of security incidents.
According to the report’s timeline, Ike’s voter information surfaced online in late May or early June 2026.
By June 1 or 2, INEC had acknowledged the disclosure and confirmed that it involved an insider.
On June 3, the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development (CJID) requested clarification from INEC on whether it had notified the NDPC about the incident.
The following day, June 4, Ike publicly expressed concern about his safety, saying he felt “unsafe”.
The researchers concluded that the publicly documented response to the incident “falls significantly short” of the obligations examined under Section 40 of the NDPA.
They identified three areas of concern: notification of the NDPC within 72 hours where legally required, direct communication with an affected individual where the breach presents a high risk, and documentation of the breach and remedial measures.
According to the report, INEC acknowledged the incident after it had become public, but there was no publicly available confirmation that the NDPC had been notified within the statutory period.
The researchers also found no publicly available evidence that Ike had been directly notified by INEC or that the commission had disclosed documentation explaining the incident and measures taken to address it.
However, they acknowledged that the NDPA does not generally require data controllers to publicise every breach or make all internal documentation available to the public.
Consequently, the absence of public information was presented as a basis for questioning the visibility of compliance rather than conclusive proof that INEC had failed to fulfil every statutory obligation.
The report further disclosed that Ike subsequently petitioned the NDPC, which commenced an investigation in June 2026 and engaged both INEC and the affected individual.
The researchers urged the Commission to conclude the investigation and make an appropriate outcome public, subject to applicable legal requirements.
Beyond the Emeka Ike incident, the report referred to other controversies involving the handling of citizens’ information in the electoral process.
It recalled an April 2025 call by the Transition Monitoring Group for the NDPC to investigate the alleged unauthorised use of constituents’ personal information during the unsuccessful recall attempt involving Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan of Kogi Central.
The report also cited an October 2025 criticism by the Media Rights Agenda concerning INEC’s demand for more than N1.5 billion for a copy of the National Register of Voters and the list of polling units.
According to the researchers, the organisation described the demand as an attempt to “weaponise cost” and raised concerns about whether it was consistent with the Freedom of Information Act, 2011, which limits access fees to the standard cost of reproducing public records.
The study nevertheless acknowledged efforts by the NDPC and INEC to improve electoral data protection through a partnership announced in April 2026.
The collaboration included plans for a joint working group, the appointment of Data Protection Officers for political parties, ISO 27701 training for INEC personnel and strengthened enforcement measures.
The researchers noted that the applicable regulatory framework contemplated financial penalties ranging from N10 million to as much as two per cent of gross annual earnings, depending on the circumstances.
Despite acknowledging the partnership, they questioned whether electoral institutions had developed sufficiently proactive systems for ensuring compliance.
According to the study, improvements in compliance had “generally followed litigation, public pressure, or breach exposure, rather than proactive institutional design”.
To address the identified concerns, the researchers proposed reforms covering legislation, regulatory oversight and institutional compliance.
They recommended that the NDPC issue an Electoral Data Protection Code of Practice specifically addressing the responsibilities of electoral bodies and political parties.
The authors also proposed amendments to the Electoral Act to clarify the lawful basis for compulsory biometric collection during voter registration.
They argued that reliance on consent could raise legal questions where a citizen must provide biometric information to exercise the right to vote, because consent may not be freely given where refusal results in exclusion from the electoral process.
The study consequently recommended that the law expressly identify legal obligation and public interest as the appropriate legal bases for such processing.
It also proposed a statutory requirement for electoral bodies to publish NDPA-compliant privacy notices before registration exercises, suggesting a period such as 30 days before commencement.
The researchers further recommended electoral-specific administrative sanctions for breaches of data protection obligations.
On regulatory oversight, the report urged the NDPC to establish a dedicated Electoral and Political Data Protection Desk to supervise INEC, the 36 SIECs and political parties throughout the year.
It called for annual compliance audits of electoral institutions, with additional scrutiny before general elections.
The authors also recommended a binding memorandum of understanding between the NDPC and INEC, alongside a similar arrangement with the Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria.
They urged the regulator to apply enforcement measures consistently and publish outcomes where permitted by law.
At the institutional level, the study proposed the appointment of Data Protection Officers across electoral commissions, with their contact information made publicly accessible.
It called for comprehensive privacy policies covering voter registration, biometric processing, BVAS, IReV, third-party technology providers and other electoral information systems.
The researchers also recommended written data processing agreements with technology vendors and mandatory Data Protection Impact Assessments before the deployment of new electoral technologies.
They suggested that redacted summaries of such assessments be made public to strengthen transparency without compromising security or confidential information.
For state electoral commissions without dedicated websites, the report proposed standardised privacy notices and dedicated privacy information pages on government portals.
It also recommended accessible procedures through which voters could exercise their data protection rights, as well as breach-response protocols consistent with the statutory 72-hour notification requirements.
Training for permanent and ad hoc electoral personnel and public education on voters’ data rights were identified as additional measures needed to improve compliance.
The researchers warned that failure to strengthen privacy safeguards could weaken confidence in Nigeria’s electoral institutions, particularly as the country approaches another general election.
They maintained that protecting electoral information should not be regarded as a peripheral technical responsibility but as a fundamental component of democratic accountability.
According to the report, closing the gap between the law and institutional practice “is not a peripheral, technical matter but a constitutive element of electoral integrity itself”.
The authors further warned that the absence of visible enforcement could create “an implicit hierarchy of accountability in which powerful public institutions are treated as de facto exempt” from obligations applicable to other data controllers.
They stressed that the credibility of the 2027 general elections would depend not only on the accuracy and security of voter registration systems but also on public confidence that electoral institutions were processing personal information lawfully and transparently.
Babalola, one of the report’s authors, is the Managing Partner of Olumide Babalola LP, a co-founder of the Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative and the pioneer Chairman of the Nigerian Bar Association Data Protection Committee.
He is also involved as a lawyer in the Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative’s case against the National Identity Management Commission before the Court of Appeal.
Voter Privacy And Umpires Olumide Babalola And Solomon Okedara Edt
His co-author, Solomon Okedara, is a digital rights lawyer and the plaintiff in Solomon Okedara v. INEC, Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1007/2023, instituted after the 2023 general election to challenge INEC’s obligations concerning Data Protection Impact Assessments in the processing of voters’ information.
The researchers concluded that protecting voters’ personal information must become a visible and enforceable responsibility of electoral institutions, warning that legal safeguards would be insufficient without effective implementation and public accountability ahead of the 2027 general elections.
The post “Voters’ Protection Has Become A Function Of Geography” — Babalola, Okedara Raise Alarm Over Data Privacy Failures Across 36 State Electoral Commissions appeared first on TheNigeriaLawyer.



