By Abdulrasaq Sulyman Abidemi
As Its Candidate After Losing A Consensus Process Or Primary Election
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of political defection has remained one of the most controversial features of Nigeria’s electoral system. In previous electoral cycles, it has become increasingly common for aspirants who fail to secure nomination under one political party to immediately defect to another political party in search of a fresh opportunity to contest elections. This practice has become notorious before the enactment of Electoral Act, 2026 that ready to regulate party primaries, consensus candidacy, and party membership registration.
A critical question therefore arises: Whether a defeated aspirant may decamp to another political party and emerge as its candidate after losing a consensus process or primary election?
At first glance, Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2026 appears to answer this question in the negative. The section imposes strict obligations on political parties concerning membership registers and eligibility to participate in party primaries. However, a closer examination of the relevant provisions reveals a significant legislative gap that may permit post-primary political defection under certain circumstances, particularly where a political party adopts the consensus method of candidate selection rather than direct or indirect primaries.
This article examines the legal implications of Sections 77 and 84 of the Electoral Act, 2026 the distinction between party primaries and consensus arrangements, and the question of locus standi in challenging nominations arising from post-primary decamping.
THE FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 77 OF THE ELECTORAL ACT, 2026
The controversy lies in the interpretation of Section 77, particularly subsections (5), (6), and (7).
Section 77 provides that:
“(4) Each political party shall make such register available to the Commission not later than 21 days before the date fixed for the party primaries, congresses or conventions.
(5) Only members whose names are contained in the register shall be eligible to vote and be voted for in party primaries, congresses and conventions.
(6) A political party shall not use any other register for party primaries, congresses and conventions except the register submitted to the Commission.
(7) A party that fails to submit the membership register within the stipulated time shall not be eligible to field a candidate for that election.”
The apparent legislative intention behind these provisions is straightforward. The National Assembly evidently sought to discourage political opportunism by preventing aspirants from participating in the nomination process of multiple political parties within the same electoral cycle.
Under the section, political parties are mandated to submit their membership registers to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) at least twenty-one days before their primaries. Furthermore, only persons whose names appear in those registers may vote or be voted for during party primaries.
On a literal interpretation, the implication appears obvious. An aspirant who contests and loses the primary election of Party A cannot subsequently defect to Party B and validly contest its primary election because his name could not have appeared in the membership register earlier submitted by Party B to INEC.
From both legal and policy perspectives, this interpretation appears sensible. It preserves party discipline, discourages political desperation, and protects the integrity of internal party democracy. Nevertheless, the issue becomes considerably more complex when the precise language of the statute is subjected to careful legal scrutiny.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORD “PRIMARIES”
The controversy surrounding Section 77 lies principally in the repeated use of the phrase “party primaries.”
Subsection (5) provides that only members whose names are contained in the submitted register shall be eligible “to vote and be voted for in party primaries.” Similarly, subsection (6) prohibits political parties from using any register other than the one submitted to INEC “for party primaries.”
The emphasis on “party primaries” is legally significant.
Under Section 84 (2) of the Electoral Act, 2026, political parties may nominate candidates through either:
Thus, the Electoral Act expressly recognizes consensus candidacy as an independent and lawful method of candidate nomination separate from conventional party primaries.
This distinction raises a critical interpretative question: does Section 77 apply equally to consensus arrangements?
The section itself does not expressly say so. The operative language consistently refers only to “party primaries.” The omission of consensus arrangements from the scope of Section 77 may not be accidental, and courts are generally reluctant to import words into statutes that the legislature deliberately or inadvertently omitted.
One of the cardinal principles of statutory interpretation is that courts must interpret statutes as they are written and not as they ought to have been written. In other words, a court cannot read into a statute provisions that do not exist.
Accordingly, if the National Assembly intended the membership register requirement to apply equally to consensus arrangements, it ought to have expressly stated so within the statute. The failure to do so creates a potential loophole capable of sustaining post-primary political defections.
CONSENSUS CANDIDACY AND THE LEGISLATIVE GAP
The consensus method under Section 84 of the Electoral Act, 2026 differs fundamentally from direct or indirect primaries. In a consensus arrangement, political parties are not necessarily required to conduct voting exercises involving the wider party membership. Rather, aspirants may voluntarily agree to the emergence of a single candidate through written consent and withdrawal.
