When Judicial Finality Defeats Justice: A Critical Examination Of The Supreme Court’s Decision In Suit No. SC/266/2017, Jokolo V. Governor Of Kebbi State & 12 ORS

By Dr. J.C Macaulay, Ph. D Texas, USA

I write this piece with a heavy heart and a profound sense of dismay at what I have witnessed unfolding within the highest court of my beloved country. Yesterday, I came across a copy of a ruling delivered by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in a chieftaincy dispute that had been determined by the Court only a few weeks earlier between JOKOLO v. GOVERNOR OF KEBBI STATE & 12 ORS. What I read shook me to the very core not because of the legal intricacies involved, but because of the glaring injustice, judicial high-handedness, and institutional overreach that the ruling so starkly revealed.

As I carefully examined the decision, I found myself confronted by a disturbing spectacle: a judgment that appeared to place technical authority above substantive justice, and judicial power above the very principles it is meant to protect. The ruling exposed, in a most unsettling manner, a system seemingly insulated from accountability and indifferent to the consequences of its own actions. For any citizen who believes in the rule of law, the experience was not merely disappointing; it was deeply troubling and profoundly alarming.

The case itself is a tragic saga that spans over two decades. In 2005, Alhaji Al-Mustapha Haruna Jokolo, the 19th Emir of Gwandu, was summarily deposed by the Governor of Kebbi State in what can only be described as a flagrant violation of every known principle of natural justice and constitutional governance. On June 3, 2005, Jokolo was lured to the Government House under false pretences, only to be surrounded by armed security operatives, forcefully removed from his emirate, and banished to Obi in Nasarawa State. No inquiry was conducted, no consultation with the Council of Chiefs was undertaken, and no opportunity was afforded to the deposed Emir to defend himself against any allegations. The deposition was announced on Kebbi State Television Service, with the Governor unilaterally declaring Jokolo dethroned and banished. This was not governance; it was tyranny masquerading as administrative action.

Jokolo, demonstrating remarkable courage and faith in the judicial system, instituted legal proceedings before the High Court of Kebbi State. After years of litigation, the trial Court delivered judgment on December 11, 2014, granting Jokolo’s reliefs and ordering his reinstatement. The Court of Appeal, Sokoto Division, affirmed this judgment on April 14, 2016. For a moment, it appeared that justice had prevailed. The courts had declared that the Governor’s action was unconstitutional, that it violated the mandatory provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law, and that Jokolo’s right to fair hearing had been egregiously violated.

Then came the Supreme Court. On June 4, 2025, by a narrow 3 – 2 majority, the apex court overturned nineteen years of litigation and two lower court judgments, holding that Jokolo’s suit was incompetent for failure to comply with Section 4(3) of the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law of Kebbi State, 1996. This is a provision that, on its face, applies to appointment disputes, not deposition disputes. In the lead judgment delivered by Justice Emmanuel Agim, the Court acknowledged the absurdity of their position but claimed to be bound by precedent, stating,

“Although I hold the view that it is ABSURD to require a pre-action complaint to the Governor that carried out the disputed deposition or appointment of a Chief for review and that there is nothing in section 4(3) or like provisions that prescribes such a requirement, I am bound by the plethora of decisions of this Court on the point in keeping with the principle of stare decisis.”

The Court consciously chose absurdity over justice. It elevated procedural technicality over constitutional rights. It sacrificed a man’s dignity and legacy on the altar of judicial inertia. Justice Agim, having acknowledged that there is nothing in Section 4(3) prescribing such a requirement and that the requirement is absurd, nevertheless claimed to be “bound by the plethora of decisions of this Court on the point in keeping with the principle of stare decisis.” He then proceeded to cite what he called a long line of authorities in support of his reasoning that whenever a chief is deposed, he must file a pre-action complaint to the governor that depose him before court should have jurisdiction to try the suit. His Lordship then cited the cases of Agbodemu & Ors v. Agboola & Ors (SC/169/2015), Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt 1546) 210, Aribisala v. Ogunyemi (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921), Adesola v. Abidoye (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt 637) 28, Gafar v. Govt of Kwara State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt 1024) 375, Olatifu v. Akomolafe (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 575) 292, and Faloye v. Awoseni (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt 717) 190. On the strength of these authorities, he concluded that the requirement was settled law.

But here is the devastating punch-line that Justice Agim conveniently overlooked: none of these cases was decided on deposition. Every single one of them was a case about appointment disputes, where candidates were contesting who should be appointed to a vacant stool. Not a single one involved a situation where a sitting chief was deposed and then challenged that deposition. Not a single one involved a chief who was arrested, banished, and placed under armed guard before being deposed. Not a single one required a deposed chief to petition the very governor who had deposed him. These authorities simply do not speak to the situation in Jokolo’s case.

To make matters worse, there has never been any case of deposition of a chief in Kebbi State to constitute any precedent on the point. Justice Agim was citing cases from Kwara State, from Oyo State, from other jurisdictions, but he could not point to a single case from Kebbi State where a deposed chief was required to petition the governor before approaching the court. He was effectively importing a rule from appointment cases and applying it to a deposition case, despite the fact that the statute draws a clear distinction between appointment (Section 4) and deposition (Sections 6 and 7). It is like using a recipe for baking a cake to cook a pot of soup and then wondering why the result is a disaster. The ingredients are different, the process is different, and the outcome is different, but Justice Agim, feeling “bound” by precedent, proceeded to bake his cake and eat it too, never mind that what he was supposed to be cooking was a pot of soup. This is not fidelity to precedent; it is a Frankenstein-like stitching together of inapposite authorities to produce a judicial monster that has no basis in law or logic.

Perhaps the most astonishing feature of this judicial episode is the irreconcilable contradiction between the lead judgment of Justice Emmanuel Agim and the purported concurring judgment of Justice Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme. Justice Agim, with commendable frankness, acknowledged that “there is nothing in Section 4(3) or similar provisions that prescribes such a requirement” and went further to describe the requirement as “absurd.” Yet, despite recognizing its absurdity and lack of statutory foundation, he considered himself bound by precedent to enforce it. Justice Chioma, however, while ostensibly concurring with the lead judgment, adopted an entirely different rationale. In her view, the suit was incompetent precisely because Section 4(3) itself provided the requirement in question. The contradiction could not be more glaring. One Justice holds that the law contains no such requirement; the other insists that the law expressly provides it. Yet both arrive at the same conclusion and are counted as forming a unanimous majority. Such reasoning defies both logic and elementary principles of judicial coherence. If Justice Chioma genuinely believed that Section 4(3) provided the requirement, then she was not concurring with Justice Agim’s reasoning but directly contradicting it on the central legal issue before the Court. Her judgment was, in substance, a dissent clothed in the language of concurrence. The result is a spectacle that would be amusing were its consequences not so grave: a litigant’s decades-long quest for justice extinguished by a majority judgment whose members could not even agree on the legal basis for the decision they imposed. It stands as a troubling illustration of how inconsistency, once elevated to the level of judicial authority, can undermine confidence in the integrity and intellectual rigor of the nation’s apex court.

The majority Justices, Agim, Tukur, and Nwosu-Iheme made much of the fact that Jokolo’s counsel did not apply to the Court to depart from its previous decisions. They reasoned that since no application for departure was made, they were bound to follow the alleged precedent, no matter how absurd the result. Justice Agim stated: “I am bound by the plethora of decisions of this Court on the point in keeping with the principle of stare decisis, until this Court departs from the prevailing case law established by its said decisions.” Justice Tukur echoed: “the 1st Cross Respondent has not invited this Court to depart from its previous decisions identified in issue 1 in line with the provisions of the Rules of this Court.” And Justice Nwosu-Iheme added: “Counsel in this appeal did not pray for departure from the previous decisions of this Court, we see no reason or justification to do so.”

With respect, this reasoning is a judicial sleight of hand that would make a conjurer blush. It is the equivalent of a judge saying, “I know this law is absurd, I know it does not exist in the statute, I know none of the authorities I am citing actually deal with this situation, but since you did not specifically ask me to depart from precedent, I am going to enforce this absurdity anyway.” The duty of a judge is to do justice, not to wait for counsel to point out the obvious.

But here is the fundamental flaw in the majority’s reasoning: there was no precedent to depart from in the first place. None of the authorities cited by the majority dealt with deposition disputes; they were all appointment cases. A case is only authority for what it actually decided, not for every proposition that can be gleaned from it. You cannot depart from what does not exist. The majority was not bound by precedent; it was bound by nothing but its own determination to reach a particular result.

Moreover, even if there had been a binding precedent, the Supreme Court has consistently held that it is not bound to follow its previous decisions where they are manifestly wrong, given per incuriam, or productive of injustice. In Bucknor-Maclean v. Inlaks Ltd, the Court held that where a previous decision is shown to be clearly wrong, it should be overruled, for justice is more important than consistency. In Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya, Obaseki JSC famously stated: “We are final not because we are infallible; we are infallible because we are final… The Supreme Court will not shirk its duty to correct itself when satisfied that an earlier decision was given in error.” The majority had the power and the duty to correct the error, but they chose instead to hide behind the technicality that no application for departure was made.

The majority’s position also ignores the fundamental principle that constitutional rights cannot be waived by mere silence. The right to fair hearing and access to court under Sections 6(6)(b) and 36(1) of the Constitution are not rights that can be defeated by a party’s failure to apply for departure from precedent. If a judgment violates the Constitution, it is a nullity, regardless of whether counsel asked the Court to depart from precedent. The majority’s reasoning effectively says that even if a judgment violates the Constitution, the Court will not correct it unless counsel specifically asks. This is a recipe for judicial tyranny, where the Court uses procedural technicalities to shield its errors from correction.

Let us be clear about what the majority was really doing. They knew that their interpretation of Section 4(3) was absurd. They knew that there was nothing in the statute prescribing such a requirement. They knew that none of the authorities they cited dealt with deposition. But instead of doing the right thing and correcting the error, they shifted the burden to Jokolo and his counsel, saying, “You did not ask us to depart from precedent, so we are going to enforce this absurdity.” It is like a doctor who knows that a patient has been misdiagnosed but says, “Well, you did not specifically ask me to reconsider the diagnosis, so I shall proceed with the wrong treatment.” The patient dies, and the doctor blames the patient for not asking the right question. This is not justice; this is judicial homicide. The majority’s reliance on Jokolo’s failure to apply for departure is not a valid legal reason for enforcing an absurd interpretation; it is a confession that they knew the interpretation was wrong but lacked the courage to correct it. It is a testament to the institutional arrogance that has come to define the Nigerian Supreme Court, an institution that would rather perpetuate an injustice than admit that it made a mistake.

The dissenting opinions delivered by Justice Uwani Musa Abba Aji and Justice Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa stand as a beacon of judicial integrity in the midst of this darkness. Justice Abba Aji identified with surgical precision the fundamental error in the majority’s reasoning, pointing out that the condition precedent for the institution of the suit was predicated upon the activation and applicability of Section 4(3) of the Chiefs Law, which the learned Senior Advocate to the Cross Appellants had misconstrued and misapplied to the case at hand. Her Lordship observed that if this provision were applied as supposedly presented and construed by the learned Senior Advocate, there would be no room for the application of the twin rules of natural justice, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alterem partem. The Governor would then turn out to be at the same time, one that can depose at his whims and caprice, prosecute the aggrieved party and be a Judge in his own cause. She further emphasized that a public officer who acts in defiance, bad faith, maliciously and without legal justification cannot benefit from the protection of the Public Officers Protection Act, as he who comes to equity must come with clean hands.

Justice Saulawa’s dissent was even more devastating in its intellectual force. He traced the history of the doctrine of stare decisis, quoting Lord Denning and Henry Bracton, and delivered a powerful rebuke to the majority’s mechanical application of precedent. His Lordship quoted Lord Denning’s observation that to a student of jurisprudence, the doctrine of precedent exercises a peculiar fascination, and he is hypnotized by it. To a practicing lawyer, it is Mr. Facing-both-ways, attracted or repelled by it according as to whether it is for him or against him. To a Judge, it comes if he chooses as a way of escape, where he does not have to think for himself as to decide for himself because it has already been decided by the previous authority. But not so for most Judges, whilst ready to applaud the doctrine of precedent when it leads to a just and fair result, they become restless under it when they are compelled by it to do what is unjust or unfair. Justice Saulawa then held unequivocally that the provision of Section 4 of the Chiefs Law was not applicable to the instant case, as the dispute was not merely the question of who between the two Cross Respondents was qualified to be appointed the Emir of Gwandu, but rather, the case of the First Cross Respondent was fundamentally anchored on the provision of Section 6 of the Chiefs Law, which requires the First Cross Appellant to strictly adhere to the mandatory legal due process by conducting an inquiry prior to carrying out deposition of an Emir.

Following the Supreme Court’s June 4, 2025 judgment, Jokolo’s new counsel, S.M. Yaru, undertook a careful review of the decision. What he discovered was alarming: the legal authorities upon which the majority had relied did not, in fact, support the proposition they were cited for. The Respondents had misrepresented the law, and the Court had been led into error, hence he filed a Motion for Review, seeking to set aside the judgment on three grounds: fraudulent misrepresentation of law by the Respondents in extending Section 4(3) to deposition disputes when it clearly applies only to appointment disputes; the subordination of justice to absurdity resulting in a per incuriam decision; and the denial of constitutional rights under Sections 6(6)(b) and 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution by erecting an unlawful barrier to the Court’s jurisdiction.

The legal basis for this motion is well established in Nigerian jurisprudence. The Supreme Court itself has enumerated the circumstances for review, including where the judgment was obtained by fraud or deceit, where the judgment is a nullity, where the Court was misled into giving judgment under a mistaken belief, where the judgment was given without jurisdiction, where the procedure adopted deprived the decision of legitimate adjudication, and where the judgment is contrary to public policy and will perpetuate injustice. In APC v. Nduul, the Supreme Court, per Galinje JSC, reaffirmed that every Court of record has inherent jurisdiction on application and in appropriate cases and circumstances to set aside its judgment or decision where the judgment or decision is null and void ab initio or where there was a fundamental defect in the proceedings which vitiated and rendered same incompetent and invalid. In Jev v. Iyortyom, the Court enumerated similar grounds for review. S.M Yaru’s application was therefore not an abuse of process; it was a legitimate invocation of established legal principles designed to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.

The events of the May 15, 2026 hearing reveal the true character of the Nigerian Supreme Court. Y.C. Maikyau, SAN, leading a team of seven Senior Advocates of Nigeria, was given ample time and opportunity to make submissions, and he took full advantage of the Court’s indulgence. What transpired next was nothing short of astonishing. Maikyau, rather than confining himself to the role of counsel, effectively assumed the mantle of the judge himself. He did not merely argue against the motion; he actively prosecuted the person of Dr. S.M. Yaru, demanding that the Court punish him and imposes a hefty fine upon him for daring to challenge the Court’s judgment. He spoke with the imperious tone of a prosecutor demanding the head of an offender, and the Court, far from checking this unprofessional overreach, appeared to receive his exhortations with approval. It was as though Maikyau had forgotten that he is an officer of the Court, not its master, and that his duty is to assist the Court in arriving at a just decision, not to incite it against a fellow legal practitioner.

When Dr. S.M Yaru rose to present his case, Justice Agim, whose judgment was under review, stalled and blocked his submissions. The same latitude that had been extended to Maikyau was abruptly withdrawn when the applicant’s counsel sought to be heard. Dr. S.M Yaru was interrupted, cut short, and effectively silenced. The Court that had patiently listened to Maikyau’s demand for punishment was now impatient to hear the very arguments that could have exposed the flaws in its earlier decision. This is not justice; this is the suppression of legitimate advocacy by a judge who cannot bear to see his errors corrected, facilitated by opposing counsel who has forgotten that his duty is to the Court, not to act as its self-appointed enforcer. When the case was adjourned for ruling, the Court reconvened with only one Justice, Jamilu Yammama Tukur, delivering the ruling. A panel of five justices sitting in a matter of constitutional importance cannot be reduced to a single justice delivering judgment. This procedural irregularity alone should vitiate the ruling.

The ruling delivered by Justice Tukur was not a judicial determination of the issues raised; it was a personal attack against counsel. The Court systematically avoided addressing the substantive questions of whether or not there was fraud on the Court, whether there was a constitutional violation, and whether justice was subordinated to absurdity. Instead, the Court attacked the person of the counsel with unprecedented vitriol. Justice Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme, in her concurring ruling, declared that the application was one of the most thoughtless and irresponsible Applications ever brought before the Court, condemnable as it amounts to Professional Misconduct on the part of counsel. She stated that it will haunt the said Counsel for the rest of his career as a Legal Practitioner for being oblivious of the consequences of his action, and that he is not worthy to be called a Legal Practitioner. This language is unbefitting of any judicial officer. It reveals not judicial impartiality but personal animus. It suggests that the Court took offense not at the legal merit of the application but at the temerity of counsel to question its judgment.

The Court then proceeded to impose sanctions that have no foundation in law. It ordered personal cost of N50 million imposed on S.M Yaru personally, not on the litigant. It further ordered that he shall lose the right of audience in any Nigerian court until payment of the fine. It also imposed a certificate of compliance requirement under Order 12 Rules 4(d), 6, and 7 of the Supreme Court Rules. This punishment goes far beyond anything contemplated by the Supreme Court Rules or any known principle of law. It is, in effect, judicial legislation, the Court creating new punishments out of thin air. By this ruling, the Supreme Court has effectively declared that fraud on the Court is not a ground for review, that constitutional violations are not a ground for review, that miscarriage of justice is not a ground for review, and that the only ground for review is a typographical error. This is not law; this is tyranny. It means that even if a Supreme Court judgment was obtained by fraud, even if it violates the Constitution, even if it perpetrates a manifest injustice, it cannot be corrected.

The Respondents’ arguments in opposition to the motion deserve critical examination. Their argument from finality is fundamentally flawed. Section 235 of the 1999 Constitution states that no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination from Supreme Court. This is not a prohibition on the Supreme Court reviewing its own decisions; it is a prohibition on appeals to other bodies. The distinction is crucial and has been recognized by the Supreme Court itself in numerous cases. The finality rule does not mean the Supreme Court is infallible; it means that when it makes a mistake, there is no higher court to correct it. This is precisely why the Court must be willing to correct its own errors. As Obaseki, JSC famously stated, “We are final not because we are infallible; we are infallible because we are final.” Their argument from fraud is disingenuous, as the particulars of fraud were supplied in the application through the misrepresentation of Section 4(3), the misrepresentation of judicial authorities, and the misrepresentation of the law. These are not mere legal disagreements; they are material misstatements that induced the Court into error. Their argument from precedent collapses under scrutiny, as none of the authorities cited by the majority dealt with deposition disputes. They were all appointment cases. The doctrine of stare decisis only applies where there is a clear ratio decidendi on the point in issue, and here, there was none.

The constitutional violation in this case is profound. Section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution vests judicial powers in the courts to determine all matters between persons or between government or authority and to any authority in Nigeria and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligation of that person. The Supreme Court’s judgment in the substantive appeal denied Jokolo access to this constitutional right. By requiring him to first petition the Governor, the very person who deposed him, the Court erected an unlawful barrier to the exercise of his constitutional rights. Section 36(1) guarantees a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other Tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. The requirement to petition the Governor violates this right in several ways. The Governor cannot be both the wrongdoer and the first adjudicator of the complaint against him under the principle of nemo judex in causa sua. Jokolo was banished and under armed guard, making it impossible for him to deliver a petition to the Governor. By requiring exhaustion of an administrative remedy that does not exist, the Court effectively denied Jokolo any remedy.

The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, the law does not compel the impossible, is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that the Supreme Court conveniently ignored. Jokolo was in banishment in Nasarawa State, physically prevented from entering Kebbi State. His residence was besieged by security operatives for months. He was under armed guard and his movements restricted. He had been removed from National Hospital, Abuja, against medical advice and returned to detention. To require a man in these circumstances to personally deliver a petition to the Governor who had orchestrated his suffering is the height of unreasonableness. It is the kind of demand that only a court indifferent to justice could make.

I must also address the role of counsel and the professional obligation of lawyers in our society. A legal practitioner has a solemn duty not only to his client but to the Court and to the nation at large. He ought to be patriotic and honest, avoiding the temptation to be swayed by momentary considerations or whims and caprices. By any reasonable standard, S.M. Yaru conducted himself professionally. He identified a genuine legal error in the Supreme Court’s judgment, filed a legitimate motion for review based on established legal principles, presented his case respectfully as evidenced by the documents, and acted courageously knowing the risks of challenging the apex court. The sanctions imposed on Dr. S.M Yaru are a threat to every lawyer in Nigeria. If a counsel cannot challenge a manifest error in a Supreme Court judgment without facing personal ruin, then the independence of the Bar is destroyed. Lawyers will become mere conduits for judicial pronouncements, afraid to question even the most egregious errors.

The argument that it was unprofessional for S.M Yaru to file the application has no basis in law or ethics. The Supreme Court itself has recognized review as available in appropriate cases. S.M Yaru’s application was based on established Supreme Court authority recognizing review for fraud and jurisdictional defects, express constitutional provisions guaranteeing access to court and fair hearing, and a clear material misrepresentation of the law by the Respondents. The argument that he should have accepted the judgment is the argument of those who believe the Supreme Court is infallible, an argument that elevates the institution above justice. The history of law is replete with examples of courageous lawyers who challenged judicial errors and ultimately prevailed. The legal profession exists to pursue justice, not to kowtow to arbitrary power. The argument that it was merely a grievance against the outcome misunderstands the nature of S.M Yaru’s application. He did not argue that the Court erred in its evaluation of evidence; he argued that the Court was induced into error by the Respondents’ misrepresentation of the law, that the Court acknowledged the absurdity of its position but felt bound by non-existent precedent, and that the Court violated constitutional rights by erecting an unlawful barrier to jurisdiction.

The Nigerian Bar Association has a constitutional and professional duty to defend the independence of the legal profession and the integrity of its members. The attack on Dr. Yaru is an attack on every lawyer in Nigeria. If the Supreme Court can arbitrarily impose a N50 million fine and strip a lawyer of the right of audience for filing a legitimate motion, then no lawyer is safe. The NBA leadership must take a stand by investigating the conduct of the Justices involved in the May 15, 2026 ruling, defending Dr. Yaru against the arbitrary sanctions imposed on him, challenging the ruling that effectively bars lawyers from filing legitimate motions, and protecting the independence of the Bar from judicial overreach. The failure of the NBA to act decisively in this matter would not be a coincidence. The judiciary and the Bar are in a symbiotic relationship, and sometimes, the Bar is reluctant to challenge judicial excesses for fear of reprisal against its members. But this is precisely when courage is needed most. If the NBA cannot defend its members against arbitrary judicial sanctions, then it has failed in its fundamental purpose.

The ruling in Jokolo v. Governor of Kebbi State has profound implications for the rule of law in Nigeria. It undermines public confidence in the judiciary when a court acknowledges that its decision is absurd but refuses to correct it. It creates a class of untouchable public officers where if public officers can violate the law with impunity, and any challenge is blocked by procedural technicalities, then the law ceases to protect citizens. It elevates form over substance when the judiciary exists to do justice, not to apply procedural rules mechanically to produce injustice. It creates a precedent for judicial tyranny if the Supreme Court can impose such sanctions on a lawyer for filing a legitimate motion. The ruling threatens the very foundation of the legal profession by making lawyers fearful of challenging judicial errors, discouraging the pursuit of justice when it conflicts with judicial ego, creating a two-tier justice system where the powerful and the well-connected can obtain justice while ordinary citizens are trapped in procedural technicalities, and degrading the professional status of lawyers, making them mere conduits for judicial pronouncements.

When the apex court of a nation behaves with such arrogance, the entire society suffers. Citizens lose faith in the ability of the courts to protect their rights. Self-help becomes more attractive as the judicial system is seen as unreliable. The social contract breaks down as citizens no longer trust the state to provide justice. The democratic fabric weakens as the judiciary ceases to be a check on executive and legislative power. The N50 million fine imposed on Dr. S.M Yaru is not a fine; it is a declaration of war on the legal profession. It says, “Dare to question us, and we will ruin you financially and professionally.” But I have stepped forward to pay this fine because I recognize that Yaru is not just a lawyer; he is a symbol of the struggle for justice in Nigeria. His courage in filing that motion, his refusal to be intimidated, his commitment to his client’s cause, these are the qualities that make a legal practitioner worthy of the name. For the NBA, the N50 million fine represents the price of silence. If the Bar Association does not defend its valuable member, it effectively endorses the judicial tyranny on display. For the legal profession, the N50 million fine represents the price of complicity. If lawyers do not stand up for their colleague, they are complicit in the destruction of the profession.

The lessons for the legal profession are clear and urgent. No one is above the law. The Supreme Court may believe it is above the law, but it is not. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and even the Supreme Court is subject to it. The Court’s ruling in Jokolo violated Sections 6 and 36 of the Constitution and no amount of judicial rhetoric can change that fact. Courage is essential in the legal profession. Those who choose to practice law must be prepared to stand up for justice, even when it means challenging the powerful. S.M Yaru’s courage should be celebrated, not punished. The NBA must act as the guardian of the legal profession. It must protect its members from arbitrary judicial sanctions. It must stand up for the rule of law. It must ensure that the judiciary operates within constitutional limits. The public must know. The public must be made aware of the tyranny being perpetrated by the Supreme Court. This is why I have spoken out, why I have committed to paying the N50 million fine, why I have exposed the judicial arrogance on display in the Jokolo case.

The Supreme Court of Nigeria, in its May 15, 2026 ruling, has betrayed the trust that the Nigerian people have placed in it. It has shown itself to be more concerned with its own infallibility than with justice, more interested in punishing counsel than in correcting error, more focused on maintaining the façade of finality than on upholding the Constitution. The time for silence is over. The time for action is now. To the NBA, I say defend M.S Yaru, challenge the arbitrary sanctions, protect the independence of the Bar, and remember the words of De Balzak that the lack of public confidence in the judiciary is the beginning of the end of society. To the legal profession, I say stand with Dr. Yaru. He has shown courage in the face of tyranny. He has reminded us that the pursuit of justice is the highest calling of the legal profession. Do not let his sacrifice be in vain. To the Nigerian people, I say demand accountability from the judiciary. The Supreme Court is not God; it can make mistakes. When it does, it should correct them, not punish those who point them out. To the Justices of the Supreme Court, I say remember your oath. Remember that you are servants of the law, not its masters. Remember that your authority rests not on coercion but on public confidence in your moral sanction. As Justice Frankfurter once said, the Court’s authority, possessed of neither the purse nor the sword, ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in moral sanction.

To S.M. Yaru, I say you are a credit to the legal profession. You have shown that courage and integrity still exist in the Nigerian Bar. You will never be forgotten. Your name will be remembered as a symbol of resistance to judicial tyranny. I have pledged to pay the N50 million fine imposed on you. I do not know you personally, but I recognize your courage. This is the solidarity that the legal profession must show. The Supreme Court of Nigeria now stands at a crossroads. It can continue down the path of arrogance, punishing those who dare to question its infallibility, or it can humble itself, acknowledging that even the highest court in the land can make errors. The legacy of the Jokolo’s case will be determined by the response of the legal profession, the NBA, and the Nigerian people. If the tyranny is allowed to continue, the Supreme Court will become an institution of oppression, feared rather than respected. If the tyranny is challenged and defeated, the Supreme Court can be restored to its rightful place as the guardian of justice and the rule of law.

This case is not just about Jokolo and Dr. Yaru. It is about the soul of the Nigerian judiciary. It is about whether the courts will be instruments of justice or tools of oppression. It is about whether the legal profession will be a beacon of hope or a collaborator in tyranny. This case matters. Every lawyer in Nigeria should read it and reflect on its implications. Every citizen should understand what is at stake. The struggle for justice in Nigeria is not over. It is far from over. But as long as there are lawyers like Dr. S.M. Yaru, as long as there are citizens like myself who are willing to stand up and be counted, as long as there are institutions like the NBA willing to fight for justice, there is hope. Let the tyrants hear the voice of the people: you cannot and will not silence us.

This article is dedicated to S.M. Yaru, a lawyer of courage and integrity, to Alhaji Al-Mustapha Haruna Jokolo, a man who fought for twenty years for justice, and to all the lawyers in Nigeria who refuse to bow to tyranny. Never forget that justice is the foundation of the law. Without it, the law is merely an organized tyranny.

FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT THIS CASE, I URGE YOU TO READ THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO THIS ARTICLE. The certified true copy of the Supreme Court’s June 4, 2025 judgment, the May 15, 2026 ruling, the Motion for Review, the Affidavit in Support, the Written Address, and the Counter-Affidavit filed by the Respondents are all attached for your perusal. Read them, study them, and draw your own conclusions. The truth is there for all to see. Do not let anyone tell you that what happened in this case was just or fair. The documents speak for themselves.

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