BY CHARLES OMOLE
The debate around the appointment of a Special Adviser on Homeland Security is understandable, especially given the already expansive powers and functions of the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA). But perhaps this moment should also force a broader conversation about the overstretching of the NSA architecture in Nigeria over the years.
Traditionally, in many advanced democracies, the NSA serves primarily as a strategic adviser and coordinator on national security matters — particularly external threats, intelligence coordination, and national security strategy. In Nigeria however, successive administrations have gradually loaded the office with a vast array of operational, administrative, commercial, and political responsibilities far beyond its original conceptual remit.
Today, the NSA office has evolved into an enormous institutional umbrella. Beyond strategic security coordination, it now oversees structures such as the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW), and several other specialised security coordination platforms.
In addition, the office has become involved in matters ranging from management of the Presidential Air Fleet to issuance of permits and clearances, oversight of various commercial security activities, and even funding obligations that should ordinarily sit elsewhere within government structures.
The result is an office that has become too broad, too crowded, and at times vulnerable to bureaucratic congestion.
Against this backdrop, a dedicated Special Adviser on Homeland Security may actually be a useful institutional innovation; if properly designed.
A focused homeland security structure could concentrate specifically on:
• Internal security coordination
• Terrorism and violent extremism prevention
• Border and immigration security
• Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection
• Inter-agency domestic intelligence fusion
• Disaster preparedness and emergency response
• Community resilience and early warning systems
This would allow the NSA to return more fully to strategic national security advisory functions, external threat assessments, military-intelligence coordination, and broader geopolitical security planning; which is closer to global best practice.
But for this arrangement to succeed, government must avoid duplication, turf wars, and institutional rivalry.
A few recommendations are important:
1. There must be a clearly defined legal and operational framework separating the mandates of the NSA and the Homeland Security Adviser.
2. The Homeland Security office (or whatever name it is called) should function as a coordinating and advisory body — not as another operational security agency competing with existing institutions.
3. Strong inter-agency protocols and reporting lines should be established to prevent confusion within the security ecosystem.
4. The new adviser must surround himself with genuine subject matter experts in intelligence, policing, cybersecurity, emergency management, border security, and strategic policy — not merely political loyalists.
5. The Office of the NSA itself should also gradually be depoliticised. If national security is to remain above politics, then the NSA must equally remain above partisan political activities and day-to-day political battles. The credibility of national security institutions depends heavily on public trust, neutrality, professionalism, and discretion.
6. Most importantly, both offices must resist the temptation of scope creep or becoming competing political power centres within the Presidency. National security works best when professionalism, institutional discipline, and strategic clarity prevail over political theatrics.
Nigeria’s security challenges are too complex for overlapping egos, bureaucratic competition, or excessive concentration of functions in one office.
What is needed is clarity of roles, institutional efficiency, strategic focus, and competent coordination.
Strategically; the President can also use the creation of this new role to balance his security advisory bandwidth. Instead of the focus on appointing only people from uniformed security backgrounds. Perhaps the President can avail himself of keeping one role exclusively for civilian experts to benefit from a more balanced and enriched advice. For example; Over half of the NSA in USA recently history have been civilian experts.
An adviser on National Security needs to have a Broad and Expansive knowledge of all things security and geopolitical global history that is not common with people for a specific uniformed security background. This was why the Jake Sullivan, Susan Rice, John Bolton and Condoleezza Rice of this world were appointed as NSA by the country with the biggest military power in the world. If these civilian experts are good enough as NSAs for the leading world economic and military power; the same approach should be good enough for Nigeria. And God knows we need a new mindset and approach to security management than what has brought us to where we are.
If you want to get something you’ve never got; you have to do something you’ve never done. We have to take new and innovative approach to solving age old problems. Simply repeating the same things will not give a new outcome. If properly structured, this appointment could strengthen Nigeria’s internal security architecture rather than weaken it.
